PROJECT, POLICY AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION

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ABSTRACT

Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) are increasingly being used in urban environments to produce new transport infrastructure and thereby facilitate a range of policy objectives including improved environmental outcomes and increased accessibility. However, the articulation of problems in a form for which MUTP is the solution, often leads to poorly integrated projects that lack public acceptance. Studies of this phenomenon have recommended various methods for inclusion of the public in consultation on the development and implementation of projects as the solution. Despite these good recommendations, MUTPs continue to show a pronounced imperviousness to genuine public consultation. This paper uses the findings from a study into the 'art of government' (as described by Michel Foucault in his theory of 'governmentality') of MUTPs based on three Australian case studies from Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. The purpose being to shed light on the attraction of MUTPs as a solution to policy problems, and the reasons for the relative imperviousness of project to genuine public consultation

Keywords: Mega project, Governmentality, Public Consultation…

INTRODUCTION

Mega projects are, as Frick (2008, p. 239) describes, engineering projects that are: colossal in size and scope; captivating because of their size, engineering achievements or aesthetic design; costly – and often under costed; controversial; complex; and have control issues. They are important not just for their scale and impact, but because their construction absorbs massive amounts of resources, not just in budgets, but in management time. They are an interruption in their location environmentally, socially and politically. Mega urban transport projects ('MUTPs') are mega projects built in urban areas in the field of transport. They are not only large in scale, but have a substantive

impact on the nature of the transport systems in the cities in which they are built, with the attendant potential to change land use and settlement patterns.

As cities around the world confront the need to adapt to larger populations, reconfigure for greater environmental and economic sustainability (Kumaraswamy & Morris, 2002), seek to implement transit oriented development (Curtis, 2007), or renew infrastructure (Capka, 2004a), the number and scale of MUTPs is likely to grow. After all "Infrastructure provides the material links allowing for the spatially disjointed city to continue functioning as a whole, and thus for the possibility of maintaining physical contacts when required." (Bertolini, 2005, p. 73). The trend towards larger and more frequent MUTPs has been supported by the development of improved project management technology (Gantt charting, organisational change management theory, BOO (and its variants) contracting, alliance contracting, economic modelling, finance structuring, and logistics management, amongst others) (Sturup, 2006). This technology has given confidence to infrastructure builders that they can manage much larger and more complex projects both in engineering and in project management terms. Projects of $500m have become almost commonplace; projects of up to $8 billion have been mooted.

Because of this increase in the number and size of MUTPs, and therefore the impact of them, it is critical that MUTPs meet time and cost budgets, and produce the outcomes, especially in terms of increased accessibility and environmental improvement, they set out to produce. Not only because resources must be husbanded, but to build and maintain sufficient public confidence to allow subsequent projects to be taken up (Allen, 2004; Capka, 2004b; Sinnette, 2004). As has been discovered in strategic planning, if cities are to be radically reshaped, through effective integration of land use and transport planning, then public acceptance must be fostered in order to "build the active support that policy needs for its effective implementation and long term success" (Friedman, 2006, p2).

It is for these reasons that concentrated research has gone into finding solutions to the persistent issues MUTPs face. Such issues include the seemingly institutionalised over estimation of economic benefits and persistent cost over runs (Allport, 2005; Boyce, 1990; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003); low transport performances and negative environmental effects such as landscape erosion, noise, pollution and in some cases total unsustainabilty, with projects not even being used quite apart from their environmental impact (Priemus, Flyvbjerg, & Wee, 2008); an over focus on technical success over strategic success (Samset, 2008) and conflict between the economic imperatives which often drive these projects and local people who bear the brunt of the impact, especially through displacement (Berman, 1982; Boyce, 1990; Gandy, 2002; Samset, 2008; Windsor & McVey, 2005).

Studies to date have produced a number of solutions to these issues, many of which relate to issues of consultation. Most obviously De Bruijn and Leijten (2007) have advocated strategies for better integration of projects in the community through consultation as well as generation of better information. However, the question of better

consultation also reaches into suggested solutions around development of more complex cost benefit analysis to include more insubstantial elements (Gunton, 2003; Haynes & Haynes, 2002; Vickerman, 2008), and strategies to the encourage the better strategic selection of projects (Samset, 2008). Despite these developments MUTP consultation processes continue to share with participatory planning processes a criticism that they are "merely tokenistic attempts by politicians and the bureaucracy to include a broader range of stakeholders" (Sarkissian, Hirst, & Stenberg, 2003, p. 6)

This paper suggests that the criticism levelled at consultation around MUTPs, although justified, is not merely a product of poor implementation of the proposed consultation, nor is it a product of our understanding of consultation being underdeveloped. Rather, it is suggested that the ontological context in which consultation arises as the solution is different to that in which MUTPs occur. Within the art of government of MUTP, the consultation proposed does not occur as correct, or appropriate. If it is applied, it seems oddly incompatible, like it has been bolted on from the outside. In the next section of the paper, the concept of 'art of government' and how it might matter to the take up of consultation will be explored. The specific art of government of MUTPs has begun to be identified as part of a PhD study. The method used in this study, and the findings relating to the use, and authenticity of consultation in the three case studies examined, will be explored through the penultimate section, before a concluding section which provides an analysis of the interaction of the art of government of MUTPs and consultation.

WHAT IS AN 'ART OF GOVERNMENT'

The idea of *art of government* was developed by Michel Foucault inside a broader set of ideas commonly referred to as *governmentality* which was presented in his lectures to the Collège De France in 1978 (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). Governmentality is a little confusing because of the way Foucault used the term. It was both the title of his paper, and therefore the entire group of thinking introduced in the paper and subsequent ones (as in the *theory of governmentality*), but it was also the name of a specific art of government, which in simplistic terms might be closely related to liberalism.

So in this paper I use the following definitions:

> *government* is 'those ways of reflecting and acting that shape, guide, and manage the conduct of persons – including ourselves' (Rose, 1996 p.41), or 'acting to affect the way in which individuals conduct themselves' (Burchell, 1996 p.20), or it is the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1991a)[1]; and

[1] It is acknowledged that this definition is different from the common usage of the term. Where necessary if I refer to that institution which is responsible for running a country I will refer to it as The Government. Similarly when using derivatives of government – governing, govern etc I mean it in the sense presented above.

mentalities are collective, relatively bounded unities of forms of thought, which cannot be readily examined from within (Dean, 1999 p.16).

the art of government is the development of and understanding of the functioning of power as an art;

an art of government is a definable mentality behind the use of power in a specific process of governing for example, sovereignty, governmentality, discipline, or the art of government of MUTP;

governmentality is a particular art of government which is the government of individuals through the development of their ability to manage their own conduct; (Hardt & Negri, 2000), (Smith, 2005)

Since the theory of governmentality was first introduced it has been used for a wide range of purposes across a range of disciplines. A number of geographers and planners have developed and used it, and particularly the method of research involved in it, in their work (for example (Dean, 1999), (Huxley, 2007), (Flyvbjerg, 1998)). Additionally, Foucault's governmentality has been the subject of numerous studies (for example (Rabinow, 1986), (Owen, 1994), (Rose, 1999), (Burchell et al., 1991)). As a specific art of government, governmentality developed in response to increasing pressure on government to deal with ever growing numbers of individuals[2]. There have been a number of studies using a governmentality frame of analysis to look at the rise of liberalism (Burchell, 1996). These studies lend themselves to the impression that there is a historicised progression of art of governments from sovereignty, through discipline to governmentality (Walters & Haahr, 2005), or that there is a progression from government, to governance, to governmentality (Dillon, 2004). However this was not Foucault's view. Governmentality does not equate to liberalism, and it does not operate as the only art of government even within liberal democracies (Foucault, 1991a, p. 102).

Foucault developed two notions about arts of government. In his lectures of 1975-6 Foucault explored the notion of the development of understandings of state power as the art of government (Foucault, 2003). Over time the art of government became something which political science, and governments themselves were concerned with and led to the identification of many *arts of government*. Thus the art of government as it stands today is actually the application of various arts of government, recognised at various points in history and for various reasons. These arts of government could be categorised as sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality (and their various forms). Each has its own logics of power, and each is developed on top of the one before. None of these arts of government have entirely disappeared. They operate in multiplicity in different institutions and operations of government even today.

For Foucault the question of government, authority and the construction of ourselves as individuals are intertwined (Dean, 1999 p.212). Critical to his understanding of the self, is

[2] Foucault subscribes to the theory that prior to the 16th century the number of persons which needed to be dealt with by the state as individuals were very few. Thus this statement is not to say that the number of individuals increased (although population increases would have meant that) but rather the number of persons, and their use as individuals was growing.

the repudiation of Kant's notion of some transcendental self (Owen, 1994), but also a transformation of Nietzsche's ideas that the self is separate from action only in language (Owen, 1994). Thus in this theory, the self is both created in language, and experienced through the application of power (our own and others). Or put another way, what is socially constructed and what is real feed back on each other. This occurs through the interplay of technology, knowledge and rationality.

Foucault observed that the various arts of government are constructed to deal with changing power relations and for ongoing management of the population, and in so doing create the circumstances which are so justified, and the technology for managing them. It is this line of thinking which has led researchers to the insight that many problems are in fact created by the solutions which become available to fix them and that projects are developed in response to problems identified in terms which allow for their solution (Murray, 2007). Put another way, when it becomes possible to do a thing, then it becomes rational to do it through the development of new understandings of the thing and what is right behaviour in the world. It is critical to undertaking studies of arts of government to understand this relationship, which is not dissimilar to the relationships described by Latour in his book chapter, 'Circulating Reference' (Latour, 1999)[3]. The insight is also related to Heidegger's observation that a thing only comes to exist as a thing when there is something wrong with it, otherwise we simply experience it (Elden, 2001). Of course this implies some doing, or that some people do things, without a rationality. They simply start doing it and it is later bounded by a rationality.

Arts of government as particularised amalgams of knowledge, technology and rationality, are a description of the way power operates in a particular theatre, discipline or institution. Foucault found these different arts of government in institutions which are as present today as they ever have been. Thus we see articulations of sovereignty in the army, in hospitals, and especially in the treatment of the mentally ill. We see articulations of discipline in youth training centres, prisons (where reform is possible), and health clinics pushing weight loss. MUTPs also manifest their art of government through their existence. These arts of government form the basis of what we might call institutional culture, where institutional culture is the specified form of an a-priori epistemology, the art of government. In this sense I am using art of government as a particular type of Heideggerian episteme: a way of being which determines what we see (Braun & Castree, 1998).

[3] Circulating reference describes the peculiarities of an expedition into the brazilian rainforest edge, into a region in which a biologist believes that the rainforest is advancing. A pedologist has been brought in to see if he can verify this. Latour attended the research expedition and uses this process to consider how scientific knowledge is constructed. He describes the transition of the forest through signs into language and then into knowledge through various technologies that the pedologist and biologist use. This is a circulating process where by things become signs become words become knowledge and back again because they never really ceased being things. The accumulation of knowledge could be said to be this process of endlessly trueing our descriptions to the world and the world to our descriptions and back again.

What this means is that there is a particular mentality given by MUTPs which informs what is logical and reasonable, how to think, and what is, and is not, to be done. It is a bounded rationality and therefore does not necessarily contain the flexibility to interact with ideas and technologies created in a different art of government. This provides a different way of explaining the difficulty that MUTPs experience in implementing the required consultation put forward as the solution to many of their problems. In much the same way that techniques for training an army don't work in quite the same way in other adult education settings. It is not that the problem is not well defined, nor that the solution is inadequate, rather the solution does not make sense when one is operating from this different mentality.

METHODOLOGY

The data set for this research was generated for the OMEGA Project 2, a study of decision making in the planning, appraisal and evaluation of 31 MUTPs in 10 countries being undertaken by the OMEGA Centre, Bartlett School of Planning, University College London. The data set includes three case studies (Melbourne's City Link, the Perth to Mandurah Railway line, and Sydney's Cross City Tunnel) made up of approximately 60 interviews, and three case study profiles developed from a comprehensive review of secondary sources about the projects. Half the interviews were conducted as "pre-hypothesis" interviews, the other interviews as "hypothesis-led" interviews.

The pre-hypothesis interviews were designed to elicit anecdotes, or story telling, about the case study, following the concept of narrative analysis as a way of understanding *complex acts of knowing* (Snowden, 2003). Interviewees were asked about pivotal events; moments of stagnation or breakthrough; moments of rescue or sabotage; and times of community suffering or inspiration.

The hypothesis-led interviews included a series of questions asked in all OMEGA Project 2 case studies and a series of questions designed specifically for the Australian case studies. The OMEGA questions concerned project success; appraisal and evaluation; sustainability; decision making processes; management of risk uncertainty and complexity; and context. The Australia specific questions addressed the question of the art of government of MUTPs, asking about specific points in the project where changes occurred; the nature of relationships between participants in the project; and the nature of projects themselves.

Interviewees included a broad range of stakeholders who had worked on or been involved with the project especially at the conception or design stage. They included public sector employees, politicians, private sector advisors, contractors, financiers, and community members. Interviewees were identified following a review of the structure of each project and identification of key players from both the private and public sectors, and subsequently through a snowballing process. Some key respondents were interviewed in both the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led interview stage. For each

case study the pre-hypothesis interviews were completed before any hypothesis led interviews were conducted (except Sydney where a truncated process was applied).

In developing the theoretical framework used in this work three main conceptions were used. Firstly, Foucault proposed that identifying the art of government in operation at any point in time

> revolves around identifying the points of transformations in discourses of government (of the self and others); the changes within and between them; their derivations, mutations and redistributions; and the relationships between them (Foucault, 1991b).

Secondly, Mitchell Dean enhanced these ideas stating that the pertinent questions to identify an art of government revolve around the notion of the technology of power. He asks: How was the activity of government calculated? Who did that calculation and what forms of knowledge did they use? What techniques and forms of knowledge were used to implement it? Who is the intended target? What are the intended outcomes? (Dean, 1999). Finally, other studies of governmentality have focussed on the relationship between problem identification and solution (Murray, 2007). Combining these three theoretical frames, the data from both sets of interviews was grouped under headings which relate to Dean's questions as follows (Table 1).

Table 1: Relationship between Dean's methodology and groups of data

Dean's question	Group Name
How was activity calculated?	Rationality of problem Rationality of solution
Who did the calculation?	Who was there
What forms of knowledge were used?	Technologies
What techniques and forms of knowledge were used to implement it?	Technologies
Who (what) was the intended target?	Rationality of the problem
What were the intended outcomes?	Rationality of the solution

A further grouping containing responses to the hypothesis-led interview question 'what is a project, when did this become one?' was also developed. The data under each grouping was then analysed for emerging issues and themes. The 'Technologies' grouping was further analysed according to technology type, and ended up including such technologies as cost benefit analysis, community consultation, transport modelling, public private partnerships, policy instruments and electronic tolling. In this paper the process of consultation employed in each case study will be explained in the context of this understanding of the technology of community consultation used by mega projects. The paper will conclude with analysis of the likely compatibility of consultation as the solution to various problems of MUTPS, and what is possible within the art of government of MUTP. Before proceeding however it is necessary to provide some details of the findings generated to date on the art of government of MUTPs. It should be noted that consultation here is used in its broadest sense. That is to mean all discussion with parties outside the project, whether formal or informal.

THE ART OF GOVERNMENT OF MUTPS AND ITS GENERAL EFFECT ON CONSULTATION

The questions 'what is a project?' and 'When did this become one?' were critical to providing a foundation for an analysis of the art of government of MUTP. Although expressed in different ways, respondents agreed that projects become projects when they are, as a former government Minster put it, 'a defined task which is not incapable of delivery'. Thus although it is not necessary to have a project plan, budget, etc. (which items represent the technology of project), for a project to become a project it does require a realistic prospect of being delivered. That prospect necessarily includes a commitment by someone with sufficient capacity to deliver, that the project will proceed assuming the parameters can be worked out and met in a reasonable fashion. Projects thus include the process of planning them, but they are clearly distinguished from a whim or an idea by a commitment to develop the abovementioned project plans and budgets and to provide the resources to deliver the project once these items are developed.

This observation about a decision point correlates with the literature on project management and mega projects, and descriptions of how projects occur (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; Boyce, 1990). It alludes to the notion that project exists within an art of government which is strongly sovereign or *pharaonic* (Boyce, 1990). That is, the authority which decides the project will occur is quickly made remote from the task of making the project operable. This is not to say that the authority is no longer involved, they may be, but once the decision has been made their role changes. The authority's involvement is now about deciding the parameters of the project rather than the question of whether the project should occur. The question of power within the project is largely avoided, the legitimacy of project actors being intertwined with the original decision which was taken. A consequence of this logic is that the original decision point must be made by an authority whose ability to do so is inviolate. The integrity of the entire project rests on that assumption. It is this element of the art of government of MUTP which precludes most obviously what might be called authentic community consultation[4]. The logic of project means that the question 'should we do this?' is no longer on the table, such a question would render violate that which must remain inviolate.

The technologies of project management strongly support the rationality of sovereignty, but also enforce a series of other logics on the MUTP. For example the Prince II program, developed by the Office of Government Commerce, UK, and widely regarded as the pre-eminent modern project management program, first requires the development of documentation which establishes who has authority within the project to make required decisions on scope, budget and so on, then it creates the documentation on

[4] Where authentic community consultation is that where all options, including not doing the project, are on the table and the purpose of the consultation is to create open dialogue about opinions, options and impacts.

which decisions must be taken (ILX Group PLC, 2009). This process is designed to create a boundary around what is and is not inside the project and renders it manageable. Thus the original sovereign decision is enabled through what might be described as a set of imposed discipline. A plan is developed which at least in theory, bounds the activity of those working in the project. Decision making in this logic is defined by the parameters of the project and limited to things which are defined as inside the project. Thus those consulted will be those affected directly by the process of building the project, a broader consultation of those impacted by the impact of the project is outside the definition of what the project is. The logic of project bounds the process of consultation, the process of determining the parameters of the project allows for serious consideration of how to minimise the impact of the project going forward.

In tracking the development of the rationality of the problem and the rationality of the solution of each of the case studies, it becomes apparent that MUTPs are sticky. While these rationalities are evolving together, the rationalities used to justify changes to the project, and hence to the understanding of the problem, and why it needs solving, tend to hang around, and re-emerge, almost never being entirely abandoned. This finding is not dissimilar to that of Millar and Lessard (2000), who also found that projects evolve. It suggests that like Machiavelli's prince, the sovereign may not make unilateral decisions simply on a whim, decisions must be justified in terms of the greater good (Machiavelli, 1979). In the art of government of MTUPs this stickiness in the rationality bleeds around the decision point, perhaps as a result of a leaking of governmentality into the art of government of MUTPs. The result of this stickiness is that even where the decision makes no reference to a rationality it sometimes remains a driving factor in the project. This may have significance for the possibility of authentic community consultation. It indicates that consultation processes may find it difficult to 'root out' these sticky rationalities, which may explain the inability of the project to hold open, transparent and rational dialogue. Secondly it indicates that effective consultation may need to focus on managing and even creating these sticky rationalities prior to the decision point, rather than after the project commences.

CONSULTATION IN EACH OF THE THREE CASE STUDIES

Sydney

The Sydney Cross City Tunnel (CCT) was first proposed in 1998 as a solution to surface street congestion, which had condensed to a level where more than 25% of traffic incidents included pedestrians (Road and Traffic Authority NSW, 1998). It was eventually built under a public private partnership between the government of NSW and CrossCity Motorway Company. The contract included three stages: design, finance and build twin tunnels (2.1 km in length following roughly the line of William St); design, finance and build changes to the surface streets (to ensure the decongested streets did

not induce further traffic); maintain and operate surface street changes and the tunnel for a concession period of 30 years and 2 months (Catalyst Communications, 2003).

The origins for the tunnel came from the City of Sydney, which developed a proposal for a tunnel that would free up pedestrian space in William St, and provide vehicle access to an underground car park. This idea was abandoned and in 1998 a tunnel proposed which would bypass 12 sets of traffic lights roughly along the route taken by William St, linking the Western Distributor to the as yet not built Eastern Distributor (Road and Traffic Authority NSW, 1998). The main purpose of the tunnel was to free up road space for pedestrians (who were at serious risk) and improve the progress of buses through the city. Consultations for this project in 1998, which included a public exhibition of the proposal, showed a broad level of community support, with initiatives to improve public transport strongly supported. The public was keen to see design improvements to Market and Druitt Streets and better connectivity along William St (PPK Environment and Infrastructure Pty Ltd, 2000, pp. 3-2). Concerns were raised with the shorter tunnel however especially the location of the eastern portal near the Australian Museum, and the idea (the mooted) of closing Park St to traffic entirely. These concerns led to a proposal to increase the length of the tunnel to connect with the Kings Cross tunnel. In 1999 when the project was resurrected, a second consultation process was conducted as part of the Environmental Impact Statement process. This consultation process included consultation with key government agencies, public meetings attended by 190 persons, and telephone contact with over 146 individuals and organisations, and resulted in the planned changes to Williams St traffic flows, and traffic flows through Woolloomooloo (PPK Environment and Infrastructure Pty Ltd, 2000, pp. 3-3)

On opening, the tunnel drew far less traffic than traffic models had predicted (Joint Select Committee on the Cross City Tunnel, 2006a). CrossCity Motorway Company proceeded with the terms of the contract to make modifications to the surface streets. This resulted in difficulties for motorists who had previously used the streets of Woolloomooloo to gain access from the Eastern Suburbs to the harbour crossings (both bridge and tunnel). The changes made crossing William St difficult and pushed motorists onto the Eastern Distributor (a toll road). The motoring lobby, undergoing a crucial election at the time, took up the cause of 'beleaguered motorists', with a massive public campaign. The ensuing public backlash led to the establishment of a Joint Committee of Parliament to examine the failings of the project (Joint Select Committee on the Cross City Tunnel, 2006b). This eventually led to the reversal of many of the traffic changes, to allow flow through traffic through the residential streets of Woolloomooloo. It also removed some of the reductions made to vehicle traffic space on William Street and reinstated east-west vehicle flow using surface streets in central Sydney.

Melbourne

CityLink was developed as a public private partnership between the State of Victoria and Transurban Pty Ltd. CityLink is 22km of roadway that provides two links, a southern link which includes two tunnels under the Yarra river that links the Westgate Freeway at Southbank with the Monash Freeway in Richmond, and a western link which includes an elevated road and bridge linking the Tullamarine Freeway with the Westgate Freeway (VicRoads, 2008). Under the original arrangements, Transurban was to act as a coordinating vehicle for a number of subcontracts, including the major design and construct contract, and the maintenance and operations contract (Transurban City Link & City Link Management, 1996).

CityLink, commenced life as a proposal to extend the Tullamarine Freeway to Footscray Road. This initial proposal was known as the Western bypass, community consultation was first held in 1984, to consider the feasibility of the proposal (whether the project was necessary or wanted). This was the only time a discussion about the feasibility of the project was conducted in the public domain. A second round of consultation was held in 1989 as part of an Environmental Effects Statement process (VicRoads, 1989).

The project for both a western and a southern bypass, was generated following consultation between the Minister for Roads and the primary roads authority in Victoria (known as VicRoads). It was the result of an analysis of the technical feasibility of the project, and traffic modelling which showed increasing congestion in central Melbourne, and that 50% of traffic in the central business district was attempting to pass through (Allen Consulting Group Pty Ltd, John B Cox, & Centre of Policy Studies, 1996, p. 6). In May1991 the government put out guidelines seeking private sector investment in infrastructure, which led to expressions of interest from the private sector in building freeway bypasses, to connect the Tullamarine Freeway with the Westgate Freeway (the western bypass) and the Westgate Freeway to the South Eastern Arterial (now known as the Monash Freeway) (the southern bypass). In June 1992 an Environmental Effects Statement process commenced (VicRoads, 1994b). This process was managed by a consultative committee formed of community representatives. It included displays of the proposed project, community meetings, and telephone hotlines. The purpose of the consultation was to inform people about the project and 'guarantee that the EES truly reflected and addressed community concerns so that the minimum performance standards set for the project would protect both road users and affected communities' (VicRoads, 1994a, p. 109)

Perth

The Perth to Mandurah railway (the Southern Suburbs Railway (SSR)) is owned and operated by the State of Western Australia. It was constructed under contract to a number of construction companies in 8 packages (Longhurst, 2008). The rail line stretches 70.1km from central Perth to Mandurah in the south, following firstly the central

median of the Kwinana Freeway to Jandakot, and then passing under the western lanes and taking a route separate to the freeway to Rockingham and then south to Mandurah (Department of Transport, 2000).

The SSR was originally mooted as a consequence of building the Northern Suburbs railway (which follows the Mitchell Freeway to north of the city to Joondalup) in 1989, when the government announced in addition to building the Northern line they would review the transport needs of the southwest corridor. As such it inherited all the rationalities that had gone into the Northern suburbs railway, most importantly that it had to be fast, convenient and comfortable enough to compete with cars on the freeway, and that it had to be a train rather than a bus.

In the period between 1989 and 1999, the SSR developed on two different tracks. The South West Area Transit group (SWAT) was given a mandate to fully review the transport needs of the South West corridor. SWAT undertook a great deal of research, and consulted widely with experts, local government and communities, and found that the area was largely self contained economically, and that the need for better transport within the corridor, and to Fremantle outweighed the need for rapid transit to Perth. They began to develop a proposal for a light rail system which would traverse all major suburban centres between Rockingham and Fremantle (Bettison, 1992). The rationalities for this system were that the majority of persons working in the area, lived in the area; that the numbers of people commuting to Perth were lower than to Fremantle; and that the idea of self sufficiency should be supported to reduce travel time, and increase the density of jobs and residences in the area.

Concurrently a revision of the metropolitan regional plan for the corridor, led to concerns to ensure reservation of space for a future rail link between Mandurah and Perth. This was picked up by Westrail, who since 1992 had been quietly supportive of a rapid rail link to Perth via Kenwick (City of Cockburn, 1992). Public consultation concerning the possible reservation of a path for the railway were conducted, largely with the response 'we don't want it here' (from interview with planner) as a result a reservation was made which follows the outskirts of the development zone, using the freeway reserve and the edges of the national parks. In 1994 the metropolitan regional scheme was amended. In 1995 Cabinet approved the financing and construction of several elements of the proposed fast rail system, put forward at the time to coincide with related developments of the Roe Highway. In 1997 Cabinet approved the development of a Master Plan for the rapid railway from Mandurah to Perth. The Master Plan process involved considerable consultation with community and effected local governments on the precise layout of the railway and the design and positioning of the stations (which were architecturally designed). The SWAT project, running to shelf metres of reports, was left behind. The light rail idea was left fallow.

HOW CONSULTATION LOOKS IN THE ART OF GOVERNMENT OF MUTP

Two case studies show the effectiveness of community consultation in the limited terms allowed by the technology of project. In both Melbourne and Perth, the projects were adjusted to allow for community concerns. City Link was built without closure of the railway line, and (after legal action) the community won concessions concerning the positioning and height of the ventilation stacks for the tunnels. In Perth the position of the railway in the freeway median was at least in part due to protests by residents who did not want the train going past their houses, the initial proposal being to place the railway down the centre of the development corridor to increase pedestrian access. The story of community consultation in Sydney is much more complicated.

There is a great deal of misinformation and mystery surrounding the problems experienced by the Cross City Tunnel. A surface reading would indicate that the road closures were a product of a cynical attempt to force traffic into the tunnel when it became clear that traffic was avoiding it. This was not the case. The road closures were put in place following considerable public consultation and at the request of residents of Woolloomooloo, who were seeking some relief from through traffic using residential streets. That along with a serious concern for pedestrians in the central business district who were increasingly at risk in the struggle with cars for sufficient road space. The subsequent public furore was led by a completely different set of publics (one that numerically represents a much smaller percentage of the population). The project can thus be seen as a fantastic story of the collapse of the ambitions set through a public consultation.

Looking through what has been established regarding the art of government of MUTP, one thing that becomes apparent is that as the public furore progressed, not only the substance of the project came into question, but whether the project should have progressed at all. The behaviour of those undertaking the decision (the Carr government and associated Ministers) was questioned, and not defended by the government which had taken over (the new premier Morris Iemma and associated Ministers). In the questioning of the project, the results of the public consultation were abandoned, along with the aspirations of residents of Woolloomooloo and the pedestrians. The problem was articulated as the government having made decisions in favour of the private provider, over the good of Sydney's motorists (the broader public disappeared from the debate). In terms of sovereignty the sovereign had violated the sacred trust – to protect the people. The project unravelled and has since struggled to regain community confidence (even after surface street changes were revoked). Once the right to make the decision was no longer inviolate, the premise on which any other actor had to act was removed. All subsequent actions concerning the project were made in a power vacuum, circumstances under which subsequent leadership was all but

impossible. The objectives of the project were abandoned and a new set of voices won a right to maintain the status quo.

Perth provides an example of how the stickiness of rationalities developed in consultation might work. One interpretation of how the direct line found favour over the SWAT proposal is that the rationalities of the Northern railway found their way into the SSR. This was despite the fact that volumes of evidence had been created to show the usefulness of those rationalities for the Southwest corridor was limited. Given the consultation done for SWAT took as it's starting point 'what should we do about public transport in this corridor?', and the SSR master plan was heavily dependent on expert rationalities, with public consultation limited to the effect of the railway, this could be said to be a defeat of a legitimate public consultation process. However it is possible to find genuine public consultation over whether Perth should have a railway system dating from a much earlier time. Many interviewees placed the commencement of the SSR project at the point that the Fremantle line was closed in the early 1980s. This closure led to an extraordinary and lengthy public campaign, cumulating in a change of government which reopened the line. The expressed demand for rail based public transport subsequently led to both the electrification of the railways, and the building of the Northern line. Thus in a sense, Perth's story is one whereby a strongly expressed objective arising from public consultation (or at least public debate), stuck.

Melbourne's CityLink calls into question the perceived need for public consultation into whether projects should occur. There was effectively no public consultation on whether the project should happen (which at the time was one of many issues the public had with the Kennett government), but considerable consultation to ameliorate the effect of the project. Despite this the project is generally considered a success, both in financial terms, and against it's objectives of removing through traffic (especially trucks) from central business district streets. The general elegance of the solution lasted almost 10 years, before an upgrade to the M1 (completed in 2009) was required, possibly due to induced traffic effects of the project. Some argue that this subsequent upgrade indicates a poor understanding of the overall transport network effects of the project (which would have privileged public transport options over the freeway) while others accept that on balance the project would be required in almost any future scenario for the transport network. Given the view expressed by interviewees that there was a 'clear need' for the project, it is unlikely that a consultation process would have rendered a different result.

CONCLUSION

The need to do better in 'authentic' consultation could not be any greater. There is a body of literature on mega projects in the developing world which points to significant conflicts in these projects between economic (led by big business) or central government objectives and locally affected people (Boyce, 1990). The issue of displacement of (and disadvantage to) local people by mega projects extends to the developed world in

particular in the treatment of native peoples, for example in Canada (Windsor & McVey, 2005), and to economically disadvantaged communities in urban areas (Berman, 1982; Gandy, 2002). Driven firstly through Lefebvre's philosophical work on the construction and importance of space (Lefebvre, 1991), there has been a shift in understanding that place is far more important in the construction of identity than previously thought ((Ingold, 2000), (Windsor & McVey, 2005)). The destruction of place is a significant issue in terms of maintenance of identity, while identity has been identified as critical to range of sociological outcomes including good health, reduced crime and social participation. Better compensation for the destruction of place or management of mega projects is unlikely to alter the outcome for individuals of destruction of their place. Much of this body of literature seems to indicate that where displacement is to occur, mega projects should be rethought, however given the very strong perceived need for these infrastructure projects this would be problematic. An alternative is the suggestion that greater public participation in both problem identification and project specification would ameliorate the worst degradations of these sorts of projects. However the connection between greater community consultation and amelioration of the issues created through identity destruction following the destruction of place, has not been proven. This suggestion indicates that MUTPs are struggling with a "communicative turn" just as planning and other disciplines have done. It also suggests that if MUTPs are to be used to significantly reconfigure cities better understanding of consultation and its role in the success of projects is vital.

The sections above have sought to provide some explanation as to why the art of government of MUTP prohibits 'authentic' public consultation, and instead privileges consultation about how project construction will affect persons in the project zone. The analysis indicates that establishment of community led objectives in contract documents (as done in Sydney) is insufficient to ensure they are carried forward. Further work is needed to understand how objectives generated through public consultation can be embedded into projects, to ensure they are not abandoned when actors change, or things go wrong. A way forward does seem to exist for 'authentic' consultation, if it can be disengaged from within specific projects and rather embedded into the visions and articulations of a city (as happened in Perth). More work on the relationship between these political articulations of a vision, and events or projects is urgently needed. For strategic planning this is perhaps an unwelcome finding. It indicates an urgent need to conduct effective consultation before projects are launched, an implicitly political activity.

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